Introduction
Against a background of alleged increases to will challenges in England and Wales, 1 the possible 4 allegation of want of knowledge and approval is made". 26 Moreover, the Civil Procedure Rules requires a party contending that a testator did not know or approve of a will's contents to give particulars of the facts and matters relied on. 27 It has already been mentioned that presumptions have traditionally played a pivotal role in this area, and it seems unlikely that the basic notion in Principle 1 can realistically be removed from English succession law. While the Law Commission has provisionally proposed a statutory presumption of capacity, it may wish to give further thought to how that would interact with Principle 1. 28 The focus of this article is therefore inevitably on other principles in the law of want of knowledge and approval, and the extent to which they support, and render practical Principle 1.
Principle 2: A Testator with Capacity who Duly Executes a Will is Presumed to Know and

Approve of its Contents
Formulations and Rationale of the Principle
In Barry v Butlin, Parke B was content to say that the burden imposed by Principle 1 "is in general discharged by proof of capacity, and the fact of execution, from which the knowledge of and assent to the contents of the instrument are assumed". 29 This Principle 2 is potentially significant even if it is "only an evidential presumption which may be displaced where the circumstances in which the will was made give rise to a sufficient suspicion that the contrary may be true", 30 such suspicions traditionally relating to Principle 3 (considered in the next section).
The rationale of Principle 2 is clear enough: it prevents the practical difficulties, of laboriously proving the will in every case, that would otherwise arise if Principle 1 were to exist in undiluted form. In Gill v Woodall, Lord Neuberger was anxious that "a court should be very cautious about accepting a contention that a will. perverse". 32 Since "[w]ills frequently give rise to feelings of disappointment or worse on the part of…would-be beneficiaries", 33 he was concerned that:
"Human nature [means that] such people will often be able to find evidence, or to persuade themselves that evidence exists…that the will did not…represent the intention of the testatrix...If judges were too ready to accept such contentions, it would risk undermining…a fundamental principle of English law, namely that people should in general be free to leave their property as they choose, and it would run the danger of encouraging people to contest wills, which could result in many estates being diminished by…legal costs."
34
He was also conscious that "if the court sets aside a will, the result will be either that an earlier will prevails or that the rules of intestacy apply: either eventuality may result in an outcome that appears to comply with the wishes of the testatrix even less than that produced by the will at issue".
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Whatever impact the ageing process might have on the will-writing population, it is difficult to disagree with Lord Neuberger's general analysis on the policy justifications for Principle 2 in most cases. 36 It is therefore ironic that, as will be seen later in this section, Lord Neuberger jeopardised the continued application of that principle in Gill itself.
The precise prerequisites for the principle arising, and its strength, have been the cause of uncertainty over the years, even before Lord Neuberger apparently cast doubt on the existence of the principle in Gill. Not all formulations mention the requirement that the testator read the will before executing it before the presumption is raised, 37 but this ingredient is at the centre of other cases. 38 
It was thankfully made clear by the House of Lords in the 1875 case of Fulton v Andrew that
Principle 2 is not a conclusive presumption even if it includes a reading requirement that has been satisfied. 39 This is contrary to some earlier authorities holding that Principle 2 is conclusive (at least 6 in the absence of actual fraud). 40 Judge Lewison QC has nevertheless interpreted Fulton as meaning that "it is only in an exceptional case that where a person of testamentary capacity reads his will, a court will refuse to infer knowledge and approval". 41 He was prepared, however, to accept that, at least in cases of borderline capacity, "the more complex the will, the greater will be the need for the explanations" of the will's contents to the testator.
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Conversely, the courts have sometimes been willing to infer reading from due execution in order to raise the presumption. 43 It seems that "[t]he appropriateness of the way in which a will is read to a testator and the reaction he had to it, however that may have been manifested, will depend on all the circumstances", and it will not necessarily be problematic if he reacts passively.
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Lord Neuberger's own formulation in Gill was that "[a]s a matter of common sense and authority, the fact that a will has been properly executed, after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testatrix, raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testatrix's intentions at the relevant time, namely the moment she executes the will". 45 This could be read as imposing an additional requirement for legal advice to Principle 2, although it might limit the function of 7 higher even than a standard of beyond reasonable doubt). This is another respect in which a member of the judiciary has caused confusion.
If Principle 2 is to continue, the law in this area would significantly benefit from a clarification of the precise requirements for the presumption to be raised and its implications. While reading might be reasonable (even if inferred), requiring legal advice would go too far in potentially robbing the presumption of a considerable amount of its practical benefit, although the absence of legal advice could be recognised as a good reason for rebutting the presumption (in combination with other factors). An onerous Principle 2 could also leave many cases where the solution is not governed by any presumption or its rebuttal, including because Principle 3 (depending on its nature and scope) does not apply either, which would again be practically undesirable.
Knowledge and Approval's Relationship with Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence
This sub-section considers the relationship of want of knowledge and approval with testamentary capacity, one of Principle 2's clearer prerequisites, and testamentary undue influence. Such relationships are particularly important in light of the Law Commission's consultation paper.
In addition to Principle 2 itself (subject to its continuing validity), the propounder can also benefit from a presumption of due execution (where the requirements of the Wills Act appear to have been carried out), 48 and of capacity in the case of a will that is rational on its face, 49 and in that respect Principle 2 is consistent with other areas of succession law.
Despite the relevance of capacity to Principle 2, the courts have not always scrupled to distinguish inter alia testamentary capacity, want of knowledge and approval and undue influence. 50 On Kerridge's analysis, pleadings themselves are often confused, perhaps deliberately due to the costs rules involved.
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There has nevertheless been some judicial disagreement as to whether or not testamentary capacity is a prerequisite for knowledge and approval. In Sharp v Adam, for example, the judge found that the alleged testator knew and approved of the disputed will, even though the testator's inability to speak, read or write meant that knowledge and approval could not be proved by 48 See, e.g., Sloan, Borkowski's Law of Succession, pp.130ff. 49 See, e.g., ibid, p.79. It has been seen that C.P. 231 has proposed a statutory presumption of capacity. 50 See, e.g., Reed, "Capacity provided that "(a) the testator believes that it gives effect to his instructions and (b) it does in fact do so". 58 As Moore-Bick LJ expressed it, "knowledge and approval requires no more than the ability to understand and approve choices that have already been made". 59 An appropriate conclusion following Perrins is that capacity is a pre-requisite for knowledge and approval, but that it is suitably adjusted to accommodate Parker v Felgate.
In a very welcome proposal, the Law Commission has provisionally proposed a clarification that testamentary capacity relates to the ability relevantly to know the contents of the will rather than whether the testator did so, 60 which should help to clarify the relationship between the two.
The very word "capacity" suggests an ability, while "knowledge and approval" relates more to a state of affairs. Principle 3, although it will be seen that there is doubt about whether Principle 3 can legitimately be used where true fraud is alleged. Since the Civil Procedure Rules came into force in 1999 the previous procedural restrictions 66 on pleading facts relevant to any other ground of invalidity of a will without specifically pleading that ground itself no longer apply to probate claims, although any alleged ground of invalidity must be properly pleaded and particularised. While the Law Commission provisionally rejected the simple extension of the general equitable doctrine to the testamentary context, 68 it proposed that a testamentary undue influence doctrine should be enshrined in statute, which would take either a "structured" or a "discretionary"
form. 69 A "structured" approach would involve a similar rebuttable presumption to the inter vivos version raised via a relationship of influence (itself presumed or proved) and a disposition calling for explanation. In the testamentary context, it would be decided whether a disposition calls for explanation based on either "the conduct of the beneficiary in relation to the making of the will" or 'the circumstances in which the will was made". 70 The Commission did not recommend any changes to the costs rules, 71 hoping that, if its reforms to undue influence (and the extent of knowledge required for want of knowledge and approval) took effect, more cases would be litigated as undue influence claims and the question of presumptions would become less relevant to a narrower knowledge and approval doctrine. This may be true to some extent, but it will become clear that its suggestion is not a comprehensive solution.
The article must now address a matter that is perhaps even more crucial than the relationship of Principle 2 with other concepts (under the current law as distinct from a reformed law), namely
whether Principle 2 has survived the difficult Court of Appeal decision in Gill v Woodall at all.
The Trouble with Gill and its Aftermath
The analysis of Lord Neuberger's remarks in Gill undertaken thus far suggests that he was a strong supporter of Principle 2 because of its important practical implications. Perhaps oddly then, and ironically raising a knowledge and approval issue of its own, when applying the unreported 1956
case of Re Crerar to cast doubt on Principle 3, 72 Lord Neuberger appeared to approve Sachs J's further assertion there that "[t]he fact that the testatrix read the document, and…that she executed it, must be given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but in law those facts are not remarks "whist rejecting the idea that a formal evidentiary presumption of knowledge and approval will be raised", 74 but that is surely unsatisfactory since either there is a presumption or there is not.
It is theoretically possible that Sachs J was saying that Principle 2 does not create an irrebuttable or legal presumption, but that would add little to saying that "in law those facts are not conclusive". Moreover, Durston treats evidential presumptions as a subspecies of legal presumptions, distinguishing them from "irrebuttable presumptions of law". 75 It seems more likely that Sachs J was distinguishing conclusive rules of law, such as that rightly rejected in Fulton, from rebuttable evidential presumptions such as Principle 2, and asserting that neither a rule of law nor a rebuttable presumption existed in relation to knowledge and approval of a validly executed will by a testator with capacity (who had read it).
Further quotations from Re Crerar appear in Re Morris. 76 On the basis that "inquiries touching the validity of a testamentary disposition have always been considered matters touching the conscience of the court", Sachs J rejected "the idea that there is any rule of law applicable to unusual cases which can so put that conscience into a strait-jacket as to preclude it from drawing inferences in the usual way and thus force the court to a decision which would, on the particular facts, be artificial". 77 It is arguable that Sachs J's reference to "unusual cases" casts doubt on his own assertion that reading and duly executing the document raises no presumption, but his general approach seems inconsistent with Principle 2 and Lord Neuberger did not quote that aspect of the judgment. Is there therefore a distinction between a presumption that the will represents the testator's intentions at the relevant time (explicitly recognised by Lord Neuberger) and a presumption of want of knowledge and approval? This cannot possibly be a distinction that Lord
Neuberger himself wished to draw, since his very formulation of the legal doctrine of want of knowledge and approval in the judgment is precisely that "the will 'represented one's testamentary intentions'". 81 He nevertheless proceeded to decide that the testatrix knew and approved of the disputed will's contents "irrespective of any presumption".
82
In the post-Gill case of Wharton v Bancroft, however, Norris J did assert that "the Court can infer knowledge and approval from proof of capacity and proof of due execution" and that this plus reading over "raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testator's intentions at the relevant time". 83 In Re Burns, the Court of Appeal's formulation was that "[i]t is right that in many a case proof of capacity and due execution will suffice to establish knowledge and approval".
84
It may be argued that there are differences between an assertion that due execution by a testator with capacity will usually discharge a burden of proof and an assertion that there is a presumption (even a rebuttable one) to that effect. It is highly significant, however, that when giving judgment in the Supreme Court in Marley v Rawlings (a case ultimately decided on rectification) Lord Neuberger said that:
"There is a rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved the contents of a regularly executed will with unexceptional provisions. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence of the circumstances in which the will was prepared or executed [or] where the will is so worded as to cast doubt on whether the testator can have known or 13 the proposition that "the prima facie case is strengthened where the will has been prepared by and independent and experienced solicitor and read over to the testator", 87 which seems to suggest that Lord Neuberger was acknowledging the existence of a weaker presumption strengthened by the addition of legal advice, rather than suggesting that it was a core feature of Principle 2. after reading over as being merely one of a number of factors which may lead to the conclusion that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will, although it will often be of great importance to that conclusion". 91 He professed both to "have adopted the holistic approach to the evidence enjoined on me by Gill v Woodall", and to "have…borne in mind the policy argument referred to by Lord Neuberger" about the importance of being slow to declare wills invalid.
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While it is gratifying that the difficulty with Gill as regards Principle 2 has been identified by at least one member of the judiciary and is not merely a product of the author's imagination, the balance of authorities suggests that some version of Principle 2 still exists. This is not necessarily a problem, and indeed Deputy Judge Martin's approach is itself not free from difficulty. The law, nevertheless, is crying out for clarification on whether Principle 2 remains valid and, if so, what its scope is, particularly given the importance for practice that it does remain true.
It has been seen that the Law Commission's hope is that its proposed reforms to the undue influence doctrine will reduce the reliance on presumptions. It proposes that knowledge and approval should be specifically confined to a requirement that the testator: "fully sensible of the wisdom of this rule, and the importance of its practical application on all occasions".
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The Scope of Suspicious Circumstances
As might be expected, the precise scope of relevant "suspicious circumstances" has been the subject of considerable uncertainty over the decades, and Kerridge has criticised the concept for failing to make clear to what the suspicion relates. 98 It might be sufficient simply to say that some facts raise a suspicion that the testator did not know and approve of the will's contents after all.
In Barry, with reference to Paske v Ollat 99 inter alia, the rule was said to be that "there are cases of Wills prepared by a Legatee, so pregnant with suspicion, that they ought to be pronounced against in the absence of evidence in support of them…". 100 It was nevertheless not true that "in every case in which the party preparing a Will derives a benefit under it, the onus probandi is shifted, and that not only a certain measure but a particular species of proof is thereupon required from the party propounding the Will". 101 Parke B gave the example of a solicitor who receives £50
from an estate worth £100,00 having drafted a will for a "man of acknowledged competence and habits of business". 102 He considered it "obvious" that the burden would not be thrown back on the propounder in such circumstances, and continued:
"All that can be truly said is that if a person, whether attorney or not, prepares a Will with a Legacy to himself, it is, at most, a suspicious circumstance, of more or less weight, according to the facts of each particular case…"
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On the facts of Barry, suspicions were raised by the fact that the preparer had taken a quarter of the estate, 104 albeit that the suspicions were removed because essentially the will was intended to be executed openly and fairly in the presence of "respectable" witnesses. 97 The relationship between the preparer of the will and the testator may affect the application of the suspicious circumstances doctrine. That said, the mere fact that it is very common for spouses to leave property to each other, or for parents to benefit their children, will not prevent the application of the doctrine to preparers falling within those categories. In Franks v Sinclair, the testatrix's son (a solicitor) conceded that the doctrine applied to him in circumstances where he had drawn up a will substantially benefiting him and excluding a nephew with whom he was not on speaking terms and to whom the testatrix was very close (in contrast to the previous will). 105 In Re Endoya, a beneficiary arranged for the taking of instructions and execution of the will, later suppressing that fact, but this was held not to be "remotely suspicious" because "she genuinely believed that she was taking steps to give effect to the deceased's wishes, in circumstances in which other members of the family had not taken the steps…, being steps which she genuinely and reasonably believed he wished to have pursued". 106 It was held that "while a course of conduct in one set of circumstances may raise suspicions, a similar course of conduct in other circumstances may be entirely innocent and above suspicion". 107 A highly fact-sensitive and potentially unpredictable approach is therefore in evidence.
Unsurprisingly, there has been some doubt on the extent to which suspicious circumstances will be present in cases beyond the beneficiary procuring or drafting the will (even if conversely not all cases where such a benefit is taken will necessarily excite suspicion). In Tyrell v Painton, it was confirmed that the suspicious circumstances doctrine was not confined to cases where the beneficiary had prepared the will, and on its facts extended the rule to circumstances where the will was prepared by the beneficiary's son. 108 In Minns v Foster, Deputy Judge Michael Briggs QC opined that "there is no limit to the type of evidence which might persuade a court that it required something more than capacity plus due execution as evidence of knowledge and approval". 109 The beneficiary's care of the deceased and suggestibility arising from bereavement were considered 104 Ibid, at 487-8. Kerridge was that the suspicious circumstances rule cannot be used "as a screen for allegations of fraud and dishonesty, which must be pleaded and proved".
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Gill v Woodall itself illustrates that suspicious circumstances can be present where the major figure aside from the testatrix neither draws up the will nor necessarily stands to benefit from it, and even where the beneficiary connected to that figure is not a human one. That said, Kerridge has suggested that Gill should have been analysed as a case of lack of capacity (not pleaded). 115 Mr and
Mrs Gill had left their farm to the survivor in the first instance and then to the RSPCA, excluding their only daughter according to Mr Gill's wishes, despite Mrs Gill describing that Society as "a waste of time" and "a bunch of townies".
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While at first instance in Gill Judge James Allen QC identified a wide range of suspicious circumstances, the Court of Appeal (in addition to their doubts about the validity of Principle 3 per se in the first place) held that many of them would on their own "fall well short of justifying the conclusion that Mrs Gill did not know or approve of the contents of the will". 117 These included the attitude of Mrs Gill to the RSPCA during her lifetime; the non-provision for her daughter in spite of care provided in addition to labour on the farm (for which gratitude had been expressed). The other, primary, factors were her agoraphobia, meaning that she feared leaving the farm and interactions with strangers, and that when she did so (particularly during meetings with her solicitor) the resulting anxiety was severe enough to limit her ability to concentrate and absorb information; that it was therefore "unlikely she would have been able to take in the entire words spoken and the effect thereof, in particular the provision for the [RSPCA] and the consequences thereof" at that meeting if the will had simply been read out (which the Court of Appeal ultimately considered probable); and that her words and conduct after signing the will were consistent with her anticipating that her family would inherit the farm.
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The fact that a will was prepared shortly before death may not itself excite suspicion even if a will had not previously been made, albeit that "there may be circumstances in which the known imminence of death may be a pointer towards the possibility that the deceased was in a state of mind in which he did not fully know and approve of what he was doing". 120 In Ark, however, HHJ Cooke took a (perhaps overly) restrictive approach meaning that inter alia the testator's previous refusal to make a will was insufficiently connected to the process of drawing up and executing the disputed will to be relevant to Principle 3. It has been seen that Lord Neuberger in Gill accepted that, at least normally, "the mere fact that the terms of a will are surprising or worse should not, without more, raise a presumption that the testator did not know or approve of the will".
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If the "suspicious circumstances" doctrine survives Gill, it is undesirable for the court to take an overly formalistic approach to the circumstances that might excite suspicion, even if a considerable degree of evidence of whatever the circumstances are might be necessary in order to avoid undermining any Principle 2. It be seen in due course, however, that Principle 3 is itself doubtful following Gill. It is not always made clear whether suspicious circumstances potentially rebut Principle 2 (leading to a further opportunity for the propounder nevertheless to prove want of approval affirmatively, so that the presumption will not necessarily be fully rebutted by the presence of suspicious circumstances) or prevent Principle 2 from arising in the first place. In Gregson v Taylor, it was suggested that Principle 2 arose in the first place only "in cases where there is no fraud, or suspicion of fraud". 124 It has been seen, however, that Marley may take a different approach, apparently suggesting that suspicious circumstances will rebut a presumption that has already arisen. 125 He did, however, define the scope of Principle 2 with reference to "unexceptional provisions".
The Effect of Suspicious Circumstances
Whether Principle 3 relates to the prerequisites for Principle 2 or provides a means of rebutting it of course depends on the formulations of Principle 2, and it was clear from the last section that not all such formulations include terminology relating to Principle 3. It is arguably denied the status of a true presumption if prevented from arising by matters extraneous to its definition. The practical importance of a widely applicable and strong Principle 2 has already been highlighted and, somewhat conversely, there is arguably little point in it being rebuttable if it arises in the first place only in the absence of suspicious circumstances. This is yet another matter requiring clarification, the best method perhaps being to say that Principle 3 potentially rebuts Principle 2 (provided both remain in existence). Facts related to Principle 3 would in addition be relevant where a Principle 2 presumption could not be raised on its own terms.
Removing the Suspicion
Barry introduces another uncertainty related to the means by which a "suspicion", once raised, may be removed: while Parke B held it unnecessary in all cases where the drafter takes a benefit under the will for "the precise species of evidence of the deceased's knowledge of the Will…to be in the shape of instructions for, or reading over the instrument, even", " 20 satisfactory…description of proof, by which the cognizance of the contents of the Will, may be brought home to the deceased". 126 As was seen in the last section, such reading might surely be pivotal in the establishment of Principle 2 rather than merely being evidence through which suspicion may be dispelled, 127 albeit that there may be a distinction between merely "reading" and Sometimes it is said that, where suspicious circumstances are present, it is for the propounder to convince the court of the "righteousness of the transaction". 128 In Fuller v Strum, however, Peter Gibson LJ described this as "perhaps an unfortunate term" because it suggests that a moral judgment on the part of the court is required.
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In Wintle v Nye, Viscount Simonds asserted that there were circumstances "so grave that
[the degree of suspicion] can hardly be removed". 130 On the facts of Wintle, in contrast to Barry, "the circumstances were such as to impose on the respondent as heavy a burden as can well be imagined" and could not be removed. 131 The testatrix was an elderly lady "unversed in business", 132 and the will left most of her estate to the solicitor who drafted it. She had expressed a wish to leave her residuary estate to charity only a few months before the disputed will was executed. She received no independent advice (the solicitor having made little effort to persuade her to acquire it), and he retained the will without giving her a copy.
Judge Behrens declared the case before him in Wyniczenko v Plucinska-Surowka may well have been a modern example of an instance where suspicion could "hardly be removed", since there
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inter alia the will was prepared on the computer of the sole beneficiary, it was in English (a language that the Polish testatrix did not speak well) and made no provision for her family or her church, the beneficiary had not explained it to her, and he had behaved suspiciously after the testatrix's death (albeit that treating this fact as suspicious for these purposes is potentially inconsistent with Re R). 133 In Re D, moreover, suspicions were raised by the fact that previous wills had been professionally advised upon and drafted, whereas the disputed one was not; that it used spelling and language in a way that would have been anathema to the testatrix; that it contained inaccurate statements about her family that she would not characteristically have included; that it contained radical changes lacking explanation, the sole beneficiary being the barely known son of the testatrix's carer; and the medical evidence suggested that the testatrix was incapable of dictating the will. 134 They were not removed.
That said, the burden of proof on the propounder remains the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt. 135 In Re Good, 136 counsel for the claimant accepted that she and her family were sufficiently involved in the execution of the will for suspicions to be excited, 137 even though their approach to the drafting solicitor was probably made on the testatrix's initial instructions and he gave independent advice on the point. The burden was nevertheless held to be discharged because inter alia of an explanatory meeting with another solicitor earlier in the same month.
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Even where suspicions are aroused and the propounder has the burden of showing knowledge and approval affirmatively, Rimer J held in Re Reynolds that "[t]hat does not, however, mean that nothing less than positive evidence of such knowledge and approval will do", since "[i]f all the circumstances properly justify an inference that the testator did know and approve the contents of the disputed will, that will be sufficient to discharge the burden." 139 No such inference could be made on the facts, since the will was drawn up on the defendant beneficiary's instructions to prove knowledge and approval", whereas "[a]bsent suspicious circumstances, the Court will assume the deceased knew and approved the will if it were read to him" (without apparently citing direct authority for those propositions). 153 Hardly a ringing endorsement of Lord Neuberger's approach in Gill.
In Wharton v Bancroft, Norris J potentially clouded the issue of a one-stage versus twostage approach by saying that he would decide the case "on the totality of the evidence without tracing the shifting evidential burden". 154 The very suggestion that the evidential burden shifts, however, may hark back to a two-stage approach, while the emphasis on "totality", seen in other cases, 155 may be an attempt to apply a one-stage approach. In Re Burns in 2016, the Court of Appeal apparently confirmed it to be unnecessary for the judge to follow the two-stage approach. 166 It was nevertheless also confirmed in Re Burns that affirmative evidence would be required where there were suspicious circumstances, albeit that sometimes not very much evidence is required.
It seems, therefore, that the courts have struggled to dispense with the notion of "suspicious circumstances" despite Gill, another source of confusion and uncertainty in the law. It has been seen that the Law Commission hopes to move "suspicious circumstances" cases to be covered by a new law of undue influence. That may be appropriate, since in many cases the reason why the testator has not acquired the requisite knowledge might be a relationship of influence that could justifiably be presumed undue, even if it falls short of the current "coercion" threshold. Undue influence may be a more apt description of the reason that the will is invalid, such that the lowering of the threshold is acceptable, and it is relatively clear that a case such as Wintle or Wyniczenko could be accommodated within the Law Commission's approach.
There are, however, at least two potential difficulties. First, the Commission's suggestion is partly premised on the assertion that "presumptions appear to have less relevance in the current state of the law given the holistic, one-stage approach to knowledge and approval preferred by the 162 
Synthesis and Conclusion
This article has taken three core principles on the law of want of knowledge and approval (that a will's propounder must "prove" it; that a testator with capacity who duly executes a will is presumed to know and approve of its contents; and that suspicious circumstances require affirmative proof of knowledge and approval) and highlighted several areas of uncertainty and confusion surrounding them. These include: the extent of "knowledge" required; the relationship of want of knowledge and approval with other succession law doctrines; the precise requirements for Principle 2 and the strength of the presumption; and the scope and effect of "suspicious circumstances" for the purposes of Principle 3 (and how these latter two matters interact with each other).
The main focus, however, has been on the continued existence and validity of Principles 2 and 3. On Banerjee's analysis, "Lord Neuberger's one stage approach [in Gill] seems to eject [the] presumption [represented by Principle 2 in this article] and shift the burden of proof to the propounder, who will have to prove knowledge and approval in addition to testamentary capacity". 170 It could certainly be argued that there is a logical consistency to saying that neither Principles 2 nor 3 now exist. If (per Sachs J) the facts involved in Principle 2 do not give rise to a presumption, there is nothing for the will challenger to rebut using Principle 3 (and the propounder does not have to rebut Principle 3 either). The facts involved in Principles 2 and 3 would simply 167 C.P. 231 at [7.147] . 168 Ibid, at [7.146] . 169 Ibid. Principle 2 pretty meaningless as a "presumption". Perhaps it means that the narrow approach to "suspicious circumstances" should no longer be applied, although Lord Neuberger was still fairly rigorous as to which circumstances were primarily relevant and which were merely supportive in the context on the facts of Gill. Or perhaps it means that the challenger does have to point to "suspicious circumstances", but rather than shifting the burden back to the propounder once proved the court simply has to evaluate their relevance on their own terms. This approach is reflected in some of the pre-Gill cases anyway.
It seems unlikely that Principle 1 will be removed from the scope of want of knowledge and approval. While the absence of undue influence is on the other side of the "line" in respect of the propounder's burden, it is arguable that knowledge and approval is closer to testamentary capacity than the absence of undue influence and therefore should in principle form part of that burden. If knowledge and approval is to continue as a separate requirement and were to be reformed in its own right, the preferable approach might therefore be to confirm Principle 2 as a true presumption (albeit a rebuttable evidential one) in view of the serious practical difficulties that might otherwise ensue, provided that its precise requirements can also be clarified.
As regards the facts that might somehow undermine the presumption (traditionally represented by Principle 3 but now undermined by Lord Neuberger and thought better dealt with through undue influence by the Law Commission), the law would also be improved if it could be confirmed whether they truly are potentially rebutting a presumption that has already arisen (with the advantages described above) rather than preventing it from arising in the first place. It should also be confirmed that a potentially wide range of circumstances might accomplish whatever process is occurring, albeit that (for example) the mere fact that a will is surprising will not necessarily be enough. It might be beneficial to dispense with the adjective "suspicious", which may undesirably imply wrongdoing that has not necessarily occurred. The simple terminology of "potentially rebutting" circumstances (if that is indeed what they do) may be better. As for whether
